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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3196
________________________
ISAAC BROOKS, JR.,
               Appellant
   v.
JEFFREY A. BEARD; FRANKLIN J. TENNIS;
RICHARD ELLER; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                                                                      
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-cv-1041)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
                                                                                        
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Possible Summary
Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 26, 2006
Before:   ROTH, FUENTES AND VANANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 14, 2006 )
                                              
OPINION
                                              
PER CURIAM
Isaac Brooks, Jr., appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Appellees have notified this Court that they will not be participating in the appeal.1
Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.  In 2003, Brooks, who is currently incarcerated at the Rockview State
Correctional Institution (“SCI-Rockview”), filed this civil rights action, asserting Eighth
Amendment and negligence claims in connection with an injury he sustained while in his
cell.  Brooks asserts that his Achilles tendon was torn by a two-inch metal pipe protruding
from the floor in his cell and that he did not receive proper medical attention for this
injury at the time it occurred or subsequently.  Brooks seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief.  
Brooks was granted in forma pauperis status in the District Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915.  As Brooks’s complaint named governmental officers and employees as
defendants, the District Court carried out its obligation to screen the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, prior to service of process.  The District Court dismissed the complaint
as legally frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and Brooks timely filed this appeal, again
proceeding pro se.
Our review of the District Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary, and,
as the allegations in the complaint do not appear to be factually frivolous, we must accept
them as true along with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.  See Allah
v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65
(3d Cir. 1996)).1
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate medical treatment,
Brooks must allege that Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991
F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1988).  Brooks can demonstrate “deliberate indifference” by showing
that Appellees were “aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists and [that they] also [drew] the inference.”  See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  However, because this is an action under
§ 1983, Brooks cannot rely solely on respondeat superior as a theory of liability; rather, he
must show personal involvement by Appellees by alleging personal direction, actual
knowledge, or acquiescence.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988).  Our review of the complaint reveals no facts alleging personal involvement on the
part of Appellees, who are prison officials and administrators.  Although the complaint
alleges that Appellees responded inappropriately to Brooks’s later-filed grievances about
his medical treatment, these allegations do not establish Appellees’ involvement in the
treatment itself.  As a result, this claim lacks an arguable basis in law and was properly
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989).
We also agree with the District Court that, irrespective of the question of
Appellees’ personal involvement, Brooks’s allegations do not demonstrate “deliberate
indifference” at all, as they state no more than negligence.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. 
Brooks’s complaint asserts that treatment for his injury was delayed by the prison medical
department.  However, the complaint also relates that when Brooks was eventually seen,
he refused to sign a cash slip as required by prison policy, thereby causing a further delay
in his treatment.  Brooks’s nonchalant behavior in refusing to sign the cash slip belies his
assertion that his injury constituted an “excessive risk” to his health and, consequently,
undermines any attempt to show deliberate indifference on the part of medical department
personnel, even if he had named any of them as defendants.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
Under these circumstances, Brooks cannot state a claim of deliberate indifference on the
basis of the delay in treatment.  Cf. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987).  Similarly, Brooks’s disagreement with the
medical decisions regarding follow-up visits to the specialist and physical therapy,
without more, does not state an Eighth Amendment violation.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Brooks’s complaint also alleges that the metal pipe in his cell floor constituted a
“dangerous condition” under the real property exception to Pennsylvania’s Sovereign
Immunity Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8521-8553.  Under this exception, in certain
circumstances, the state may be found liable for damages caused by “[a] dangerous
condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-
owned real property...” See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522(b)(4).  The District Court did not
specifically address this argument, holding generally that Brooks’s suit against the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections was barred by the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.  We agree and note, for clarification purposes, that the real property exception
to sovereign immunity does not apply here.  Although the Pennsylvania legislature has
carved out nine exceptions, including the one described above, to its sovereign immunity
from suit, the state has expressly retained its Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes
of federal lawsuits:  “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the
immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). 
Therefore, Brooks’s attempt to invoke the real estate exception is misplaced in this
lawsuit.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
